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Introduction 
Life-long farmer Thomas Jefferson prioritized agriculture in his presidential 
administration because he envisioned a nation of yeoman farmers laboring upon the fertile 
New World soil, nourishing the nascent American society with the food they produced. To-
day, nearly two hundred years removed from the lifetime of Thomas Jefferson, the goal of 
supporting this noble profession has spawned several agricultural price support programs. 
However, these numerous programs seem to have a convoluted rationale and, at best, 
questionable justifications in today‘s neo-liberal trade climate. In fact, they seem to fly in 
the face of both classical Liberal economic theories and the American tradition of the Prot-
estant work ethic. Facing fierce opponents and equally fierce advocates, the programs are 
indeed beneficial to farmers; however, they come at a high cost to others. Through a look 
at government intervention in the sugar sector, this paper seeks to answer several ques-
tions: Why support sugar? What are the consequences of this support, both in America and 
abroad? And finally, when did this practice begin, and is there any foreseeable end? 
Background 
In order to understand the debate over sugar price support programs, it is neces-
sary to understand what tools are used to enact these programs. Contrary to popular be-
lief, there are no direct subsidies to sugar farmers. Instead, a complex system of price sup-
port loans and tariffs are employed by the United States government to manipulate do-
mestic market sugar commodity prices to keep them among the very highest anywhere.1 
The simplest way to describe the loan system is as a means to keep the price of U.S. sugar 
high, and the easiest way to describe the tariff system is as a means to create barriers to 
competition which would result in bringing those artificially-high domestic prices back 
down to international market levels.  
Program Mechanisms 
According to the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) website, the loan pro-
gram for domestic sugar producers is implemented via USDA-administered discount loans 
that are twenty percent below market interest rates. The program thus gives financial 
benefits to domestic sugar producers through this discount loan program in the form of 
savings on interest payments. The loans are ―non-recourse,‖ meaning that the government 
must accept sugar as a payment in the event that a processor defaults on their loan. Such 
forfeitures result in the Commodity Credit Corporation, the USDA‘s agricultural price sta-
bilization branch, receiving tons of surplus sugar. However, the forfeiture of sugar to the 
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government is avoided at all costs, as it will result in either wasted sugar or excess sugar 
on the market that serves to depress prices for all U.S. sugar producers, thereby negating 
the intended price-bolstering effects of the loans. This means that the government must 
take action to keep the domestic market price of sugar at a price that allows U.S. sugar 
producers to repay their loans and make a profit. This target price is known as the market 
price objective.2 
 To achieve the market price objective, the USDA administers a sugar import-
restriction program known as tariff-rate quota system (TRQ). Under this system, the Sec-
retary of Agriculture sets an aggregate sugar import limit to which a limited tariff will be 
applied for all countries that import sugar to the U.S. Once a country reaches its import 
limit, that country must pay a second, higher tariff on all addition sugar it wishes to send 
into U.S. markets.3 These secondary, higher tariffs collectively serve to limit sugar imports 
to the U.S. The economics behind this are increases in foreign sugar producers‘ costs of ex-
porting their product to the U.S. because of the secondary tariffs, resulting in a smaller 
supply of sugar on the domestic commodity market. The restricted supply raises domestic 
sugar prices, allowing farmers to get the sort of revenue needed to repay the sugar support 
loan program. Thus, the TRQ program creates a commodity climate which favors the re-
payment of sugar support loans through higher profits to sellers in the domestic market. 
 In addition to discounted rate loans and the TRQ system, sugar price support pro-
grams include limits on what domestic producers can grow.4 In this restricted-output con-
text, a situation arises that is analogous to a scarcity with higher prices resulting in di-
minished supply. These higher prices, much like the TRQ secondary tariffs, help to ensure 
that farmers can repay their loans as well as contribute to the program‘s financial benefit 
to farmers. 
Program History 
The federal government has operated variations of sugar price support programs 
for over 72 years. While this may seem like a relatively short period of time for the govern-
ment to be involved in the sugar sector, it is slightly misleading because the government 
has, in fact, been involved in the economics of domestic sugar production in one way or an-
other since the United States‘ inception over 230 years ago.5 The website for the American 
Sugar beet Growers Association says that the first tariff on sugar imports was imposed by 
the U.S. in 1789, for the purpose of generating federal revenue, and tariffs on sugar im-
ports have continued virtually without interruption ever since.  
The same website summarizes the government‘s relation to the sugar growing com-
munity nicely: ―The nature of intervention in sugar marketing changed significantly near 
the end of the 19thcentury as the rationale for high sugar tariffs shifted from generation of 
revenue to protection of a domestic industry.‖6 It was not until a hundred years later, in 
1890, that the rationale behind tariff policies began morphing from revenue generation to 
protection of domestic sugar producers. This policy intention remains a shaping force of 
today‘s interventionist sugar price policies. The traces of America‘s current system go back 
to 1934 with the introduction of import quotas that allocated specific quota amounts to dif-
ferent trade partners, such as Mexico and Jamaica. These policies, which sugar producers 
rationalized as necessary for the protection of domestic producers in an increasingly 
flooded and price-depressed international market, continued through the 1960s.7 
Pepperdine Policy Review ▪ Volume II, Spring 2009 
34 
 
 The international sugar surpluses of the early 1970s convinced Congress that sugar 
price support programs were no longer necessary. Consequently, Congress did not renew 
the legislation authorizing the price support programs. Ironically, the years immediately 
following the expiration of this legislation saw a sharp rise in international sugar produc-
tion. Congress rushed to reinstate price support programs for the crop, known as the Food 
and Agriculture Act of 1977.8 Through this act, loans became an integral part of the sugar 
price support programs, and the tariff system took on new importance in maintaining the 
sugar price floor, or market price objective. Again, according to the American Sugar beet 
Growers Association website, the new legislation reinstated import restrictions to protect 
sugar support loans: ―To encourage processors to sell their sugar in the marketplace 
rather than forfeit it to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), import duties and fees 
were used to maintain the domestic sugar price at a level called the market price objec-
tive.‖9 
The Current Debate 
Domestic Consequences  
 Price support advocates and legislators call the current system of sugar price sup-
port a ―no-cost‖ policy. In fact, in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Con-
gress mandated that the USDA continue to operate sugar price support programs at no 
cost, just as they had been required to operate these programs under the provisions of the 
Farm Security and Rural Reinvestment Act of 2002.10 Others counter that these programs 
do have a cost, namely American consumers paying $1.4 billion dollars in higher sugar 
costs.11 In fact, both arguments are correct, although the former argument is misleading 
because it only takes into account net government outlays and ignores costs incurred to 
any entity outside of the government. So while it is true that the government does not allo-
cate any of the federal budget towards sugar programs in the form of direct subsidies, 
there are two costs associated with the sugar price support programs that are difficult to 
trace, and for this reason, tend to fly under the radar.  
The first cost constitutes what economists call a transaction cost. Any action taken on 
the part of the government has an implicit associated cost. Although it may not be imme-
diately obvious, as is the case at hand in which government outlays have a net value of 
zero, the creation and administration of the sugar commodity support system does cost 
taxpayers because of the cost associated with employing those who implement the pro-
grams. Thus, any government policy, including the sugar price support programs, costs 
money to implement, and therefore, cannot be accurately described as ―no-cost.‖  
 The second effect not accounted for is that the additional cost paid annually by 
American consumers in the form of higher sugar prices that result from the sugar price 
support system. In fact, the very goal of the sugar price support programs is to raise the 
domestic price of sugar. The 2008 Farm Act, for example, prohibits domestic human con-
sumption of excess sugar that has been forfeited to the CCC – these excess sugar stocks 
must be converted into ethanol instead.12 Were these excess sugar supplies added to the 
domestic sugar market, prices would of course decrease and it is this precisely what this 
provision of the 2008 Farm Act seeks to prevent. According to various sources, this and 
other program provisions amount to an estimated $1.4 billion dollars in the form of higher 
food prices for U.S consumers.13 This is easy to miss because this particular cost does not 
come out of the consumer‘s income in the form of taxes paid to the government, but rather 
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in the form of a higher food bill for the consumer. By artificially inflating prices, sugar 
support programs force higher prices on the consumers, creating a similar effect to a sugar 
excise tax. 
An additional cost of the program is what economists call a negative externality: the 
cost of environmental degradation inflicted on the Florida Everglades by pollution from 
the local sugar industry.14 Through their creation of artificially high sugar prices, the gov-
ernment‘s sugar support policies create incentive to join the sugar industry, resulting in 
an overabundance of sugar producers. These superfluous producers near the Florida Ever-
glades, some argue, produce run-off that creates an environmental disaster with a $400 
million to $700 million clean-up cost. 
 Furthermore, the sugar price support system promulgates yet another cost in al-
lowing the growers of corn – which can be processed into sugar substitutes like high fruc-
tose corn syrup – to undercut sugar prices by a few cents to make a big profit.15 Americans 
have steadily increased their consumption of high fructose corn syrups since Japanese re-
searchers first developed a method to use corn to produce this sugar substitute in the 
1970s. Following this discovery, soda, candy and other food manufacturers raced to use 
this cheap sugar substitute in their products. The health effects of consuming sugar versus 
consuming corn syrup are highly debated. Opponents of the corn-derived sweetener point 
to some potential health hazards of high fructose corn syrup. For example, a website for 
the Weston A. Price Foundation, a non-profit organization that advocates policies that en-
courage a healthier diet, makes the charge that the high levels of fructose contained in the 
syrup prevent the effective absorption of copper, a mineral necessary to form collagen and 
elastin: ―High fructose corn syrup (HFCS) began to gain popularity as a sweetener because 
it was much less expensive to produce…Thus, with almost twice the fructose, high fructose 
corn syrup delivers a double danger compared to sugar.‖16 Others, like the University of 
British Columbia‘s Garry Yang, go even farther in inveighing against high fructose corn 
syrup, claiming, as Yang does, that ―it is no coincidence that the emergence of HFCS usage 
in food is shadowed by the increase in obesity worldwide.‖17 
 In addition to complaints about the negative health effects brought about by the 
sugar price support programs, opponents claim that these programs perpetuate a manipu-
lation of our democracy as the sugar lobby buys votes for legislation that favor these pro-
grams in exchange for generous campaign contributions to members of Congress.18 Propo-
nents of this particular critique note the $11.9 million contributed by sugar-producing in-
terests to congressional campaigns between 1979 and 1995.19 They also point to the 
―enormous political clout‖ of the ―formidable lobbying machine‖ of sugar producers.20 Fur-
ther supporting their claim is a bit of interesting anecdotal evidence from the Reagan era. 
Fearing that the ―efficient sugar-producing nations of the Caribbean and Central and 
South America‖ would ―quickly seize upon open markets in North America and Europe for 
their exports‖ in the event of sugar trade liberalization, U.S. sugar producers ―secured key 
positions on the USDA advisory committee‖ and sent a lobbyist all the way to Geneva to 
monitor and influence the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations.21 While 
there may be a correlation between a candidate‘s support for legislation that benefits 
sugar producers and those same sugar producers‘ contributions to said candidate‘s cam-
paign funds, it is difficult to prove causation. Nevertheless, this relationship between cam-
paign contributions and legislation that favors contributors is a compelling one, and can be 
pointed to as likely reason for the continued existence of sugar price support programs. 
Leveling another charge against the sugar price support system is Fran Smith of 
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the Competitive Enterprise Institute, who cites a U.S. Department of Commerce study 
from February 2006 which ―found that limiting sugar imports was ‗a major factor‘ in the 
loss of 10,000 jobs in candy manufacturing.‖22 Smith has a compelling point: by causing 
inflated sugar prices – a staple of the candy manufacturing process – government price 
support programs diminish the amount of candy that producers are can afford to manufac-
ture. While a diminished output of candy would seemingly reduce obesity, the calories 
saved through reduced candy consumption are reappearing in thousands of food products 
in the form of cheap corn syrup, ultimately resulting in a net gain in calories and an in-
crease in obesity rates. Furthermore, getting to the heart of Smith‘s argument, thousands 
of candy manufacturing jobs are lost as a consequence of sugar price support programs. 
The domestic consequences of the sugar price support programs are varied and often 
difficult to pin down. Undoubtedly, these programs serve to provide benefits to some – 
namely, domestic sugar producers. The more interesting and compelling issue is the one of 
costs, not the one of benefits. There is no debate over the fact that the programs do have 
highly concentrated benefits and widespread costs, with only one percent of sugar growers 
receiving 43 percent of the benefits of the price support programs.23 
International Aspects 
Turning from the domestic aspects to the international aspects of America‘s sugar 
price support system, many interesting questions arise. First, do domestic sugar price sup-
port programs have a deleterious effect on foreign sugar farmers? Second, how do these 
programs fit into international trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT? And lastly, do 
such trade agreements put pressure upon the U.S. government to liberalize their trade 
policies with respect to sugar? 
Protectionist policies have made their way into the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. In fact, in a challenge to the quota system administered by the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, Australia successfully brought a claim against the U.S. in 1988 
under GATT, alleging that U.S. sugar import quotas were a violation of GATT rules: 
The GATT Council had found that the complex system of U.S. quotas im-
posed on foreign exporters of sugar to the U.S. market was a violation of 
GATT Article XI because it contained quantitative import restrictions. In 
other words, the U.S. sugar program assigned specific quotas, in tons, to 
dozens of nations that export sugar to the United States. To get around the 
problem, [the U.S.] simply reorganized the quota system into a tariff-rate 
system. Each country that had a quota to export sugar to the United States 
was allowed to export a certain number of tons virtually free of any tariff, 
but once that limit was reached a very high tariff (16 cents a pound for raw 
sugar) would be imposed, effectively barring additional exports.24 
This explains the reasoning behind the switch from a quota system with minor associated 
tariffs to the TRQ system that was discussed above in the Program Mechanics and Pro-
gram History sections. The TRQ system, while charging nations like Australia hefty addi-
tional tariffs for any imports that exceed their quotas, is a victory for sugar exporting na-
tions who can now sell more sugar in the American market and consequently receive 
prices that are two to three times that international market rate.25 
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In addition to GATT, other international trade agreements compel the United 
States to liberalize their policies for sugar imports. The World Trade Organization‘s Doha 
Development Agenda is one of these forces. It seeks to make developing countries part of 
the world trading system through reform of protectionist agricultural policies. The United 
States is not the only one feeling the pressure. The European Union is also under consider-
able pressure, especially from developing countries involved in the Doha negotiations, to 
substantially reduce their domestic agricultural subsidies, which the WTO calls ―trade dis-
torting.‖26 Such forces run up against the desire of sugar farmers and their boosters in 
Congress to maintain America‘s long-standing sugar price support programs. 
 Despite charges of selectivity, and even hypocrisy, in its advocacy of trade liberali-
zation, the United States does face a number of complicating factors in its considerations 
regarding trade liberalization.  Among these is the fear that ―eliminating the sugar pro-
grams would be a form of ‗unilateral disarmament,‘ leaving the U.S. with no leverage to 
convince European states to do away with their own trade-restrictive sugar import poli-
cies.‖27 Additionally, U.S. participation in NAFTA has come along with challenges from 
Mexico to sugar price support programs. On January 1, 2008, under the provisions of 
NAFTA, all tariffs and customs duties for sugar trade between the U.S. and Mexico were 
lifted. Prices of sugar in the U.S. domestic market were expected to drop due to this antici-
pated influx of Mexican sugar. In an attempt to confront the consequential threat to their 
revenue, U.S. sugar producers successfully lobbied Congress to include in the 2008 Farm 
Act a provision that would allow the CCC to in effect purchase enough domestically-
produced sugar to maintain the supply levels that existed prior to the January 2008 in-
crease in sugar imports from Mexico. The effects of this provision have been hard to gauge 
because of a February 2008 fire that destroyed a sugar refinery plant in Port Wentworth, 
Georgia whose products accounted for a significant share of the U.S. domestic sugar sup-
ply. Despite the NAFTA-generated increase in Mexican sugar imports, the loss of U.S. 
sugar refinery capacity made sugar supplies became scarcer, allowing for domestic sugar 
prices to remain at previous levels. Without the anticipated drop in price levels, the CCC 
was able to avoid purchasing excess sugar stock. It will therefore still be some time before 
the combined impact of increased Mexican sugar imports and CCC purchasing of excess 
domestically-produced sugar supplies can be measured, but it has been reported that the 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that this will result in $660 million cost.29 It will be 
interesting to see how the USDA will offset this anticipated cost given the 2008 Farm Act 
provision which mandates that sugar price support programs operate with no net change 
to government outlays. 
The Future of Sugar Price Support Programs 
American agricultural price support programs, specifically those in the sugar sec-
tor, continue to exist because of strong political support in Congress. The reasons behind 
this support seem to be a robust lobbying effort on the part of sugar producers. Stemming 
from these programs are several domestic and international consequences: government-
granted financial benefits to sugar growers which are subsidized by consumers via in-
creased sugar and food prices, high domestic consumption levels of health-harming high 
fructose corn syrup, and a hypocritical and selective international trade liberalization pol-
icy. Despite some challenges from the international trade community, Congress‘ century-
old support for sugar prices is unlikely to significantly change course in the foreseeable 
future. 
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